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OPINION OF THE DISTRICT COURT
State of North Dakota
County of McHenry.
Regional Agricultural Credit Corporation
of Minneapolis, a corporation,
Plaintiff,
vs.
E. C. Drader and Lena Drader,
Defendants.

In District Court,
Second Judicial District.

MEMORANDUM
DECISION

Plaintiff brings this action upon a promissory note made to the plaintiff
by defendants, E. C. and Lena Drader, dated April 5, 1934, due October
10, 1935 for $1,172.81, with interest at 6
per cent, on which payments
have been made August 24, 1934, $75.00, October 2, 1934, $194.00, February 21, 1935, $15.96; leaving then due $887.85. No renewal or payments have been made since. An itemized statement shows that on June
10, 1946, when this action was brought, there was due on this note
$1,433.46.
This note was a renewal of a note signed by E. C. Drader alone, dated
October 5, 1933, for $1,128.67, due April 5, 1934, with interest at 6
per cent. That note, again, was a renewal of the original note for $1,100.00
at 6
per cent dated April 5, 1933, due October 5, 1933, marked
"Barnyard" indicating that this was one of the so-called barnyard
loans and was secured by a chattel mortgage on defendant's stock.
The answer admits the note and payments- and sets up the defense
of the statute of limitations, claiming that its enforcement is barred by
section 28-0116 N. D. R. C. 1943.
If that statute supplies the defense is good and the action must be dismissed. Otherwise judgment must be granted plaintiff with interest to
date.
On January 22, 1932 Congress created a body corporate with the
name "Reconstruction Finance Corporation", to refinance business and
agriculture. As a part of that act Congress authorized said Reconstruction Finance Corporation to create in any of the twelve Federal
Land Bank Districts a Regional Agricultural Credit Corporation
with a paid up capital of not less than three million to be subscribed for
by the Reconstruction Finance Corporation and paid by the Secretary
of Agriculture. The Act then provides "such corporations are hereby
authorized and empowered to make loans or advances to farmers and
stockmen, proceeds of which are to be used for an agricultural purpose
and (including crop production) or for the raising, breeding, fattening
or marketing of livestock, to charge such' rates of interest or discount
thereon as in their judgment are fair and equitable, subject to the
approval of the Reconstruction Finance Corporation and to re-discount
with the Reconstruction Finance Corporation and the various Federal
Reserve Banks and Federal Intermediate Credit Banks any paper that
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they require which is eligible for such purpose." Later the Act was
amended to substitute the Farm Credit Administration for the Reconstruction Finance Corporation in the management and control of the
RACC, otherwise the corporation has remained the same, except that
now it is in the process of liquidation.
Whether a corporation thus created by Congress retains the immunities of the Government or is subject to local laws governing commercial
corporations depends entirely upon the intent of Congress. In Casper vs.
Regional Agricultural Credit Corporation (Minn.) 278 N. W. 896 it is
held:
"Congress has full power to determine to what extent instrumentalities
of the federal government partake of its sovereign character and immunity from suit. Whether federal agencies are subject to suit and
to what extent is a question of congessional intent. Federal Land
Bank vs. Priddy, 295 U. S. 229, 55 S. Ct. 705, 706, 79 L. Ed. 1408. The
general rule is that the sovereign immunity of the United States
loes not extend to its agents, individual or corporate. Sloan Shipyards
Corp. vs. U. S. Fleet Corp., 258 U. S. 549, 42 S. Ct. 386, 388, 66 L. Ed.
762; United States v. Lee, 106 U. S. 196, 1 S. Ct. 240, 27 L. Ed. 171;
Belknap v. Schild, 161 U. S. 10, 16 S. Ct. 443, 40 L. Ed. 599; 26 R.C.L.
1459, 63, note 15; note, 15 Ann. Cas. 1109. No rule has been laid down by
the Supreme Court of the United States by which the congressional
intent may be determined in a particular case."
This intent must be determined from the wording of the statute,
the nature of the government instrumentality established and all the
circumstances bearing upon the enactment of the law.
In Keifer & Keifer v. Reconstruction Finance Corporation, 306 U.
S. 381; 83 Law Ed. 784, it is put this way:
"The Congressional will must be divined, and by a process of interpretation which, in effect, is the ascertainment of policy immanent not
merely in the single statute from which flow the rights and responsibilities of Regional, but in a series of statutes utilizing corporations for
governmental purposes and drawing significance from dominant contemporaneous opinion regarding the immunity of governmental agencies from suit."
"In U. S. ex rel Skinner & Eddy Corp. v. McCarl, 275 U. S. 1, 48 S. Ct.
12, 72 L. Ed. 131, it was pointed out that such corporations are created
for convenience, it being supposed that the corporate form enables them
to employ commercial methods and to conduct their operations with a
freedom inconsistent with accountability to the treasury under its established procedure of audit and control over financial transactions of the
United States. To the extent that such convenience is served, the corporate entity is recognized. It is recognized for all purposes relating to
the transaction Of ordinary corporate business and affairs." Casper vs.
RACC, supra.
It has been held that when a parent corporation like the Reconstruction
Finance Corporation is authorized to organize another corporation like
the RACC it transmits the limitations of its immunitiese to such corporations without specific enumeration in the Congressional Act authorizing such organization.
In Keifer & Keifer v. Reconstruction Finance Corporation, supra, it
is said:
"Congress naturally assumed that the general corporate powers to which
it had given particularity in the original statute establishing Reconstruction would flow automatically to the Regionals from the source of
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their being. Such, certainly, has been the practical construction of the
Regional Agricultural Credit Corporation in the instinctive pursuit of
their enterprise."
Thus there is no reference in the act creating the RACC to its liability
to suit; but, because the RFC is particularly made liable to suit it followed
that the RACC is also liable to suit.
In Keifer & Keifer vs. Reconstruction Finance Corporation, supra:
"The government does not become the conduit of its immunity in suits
against its agents or instrumentalities merely because they do its
work."
In Federal Housing Administration v. Burr, 309 U. S. 242; 84 Law
Ed. 724, the Court said:
"As indicated in Keifer & Keifer vs. Reconstruction Finance Corp., supra,
we start from the premise that such waivers by Congress of governmental immunity in case of such federal instrumentalities should be
liberally construed. This policy is in line with the current disfavor of
the doctrine of governmental immunity from suit, as evidenced by the
increasing tendency of Congress to waive the immunity where federal
governmental corporations are concerned."
It is common knowledge that the RACC was engaged in a commercial
business. It loaned money to farmers upon security; it maintained a
system of collections. Except that it had more capital and could carry
on its business in a more liberal manner it acted exactly the same as a
private corporation.
The following quotation from Gill v. Reese, 4 N. E. 2d 273, this concerning the Home Owners Loan Corporation, applies as well to the RACC:
"The business in which the defendant corporation was to be engaged,
to wit, that of loaning money and refinancing mortgages on real estate
security, was such as had therefore been conducted by private persons
and corporations. While it is true that the act provided that the United
States government should own all of the capital stock, and the fact is
that all of the capital stock is owned by the United States government, yet
it has long been settled that those circumstances in no way change the
character of the corporation, and that it still remains in the eyes of
the law a private. corporation. Osborn v. Bank of U. S., 9 Wheat. (22
U. S.) 738, 807, 6 L. Ed. 204; Bank of U.S. v. Planters' Bank of Georgia,
9 Wheat. (22 U. S. 904, 6 L. Ed. 244; Huntingdon, C. & I. Turnpike Co.
v. Wallace, 8 Watts (Pa) 316; Seymour v. Milford & C. Turnpike Road
Co., 10 Ohio, 476; Haines v .Lone Star Shipbuilding Co., 268 Pa. 92, 110
A. 788.
Great confusion has arisen in the submission of this case to this court
on the proposition whether or not the corporation itself is a public one.
There can be no question but that the corporation is an instrumentality of
the government, engaged in a great undertaking effecting the public.
The distinction failed to be recognized is that, while the underatking
itself has the characteristics of a public enterprise, yet the acts have
been authorized by Congress itself to be performed by and through the
arm of a private corporation, rather than'by means of the exercise of
power by a government officer, or by the legislative body itself. The
authorities are uniform in establishing the law to be that such a corporation is a private corporation."
In Gould Coupler Co. v. U. S. Shipping Board Emergency Fleet Corp.,
261 E. 716, 718, it is said:
"It is in general highly desirable that, in entering upon industrial and
commercial ventures, the government agencies used should, whenever
it can fairly be drawn from the statutes, be subject to the same liabilities
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and to the same tribunals as other persons or corporations similarly employed."
That seems to be the principle followed generally in recent decisions
of the Supreme Court of the United States.
Because of the emergencies existing, and especially during the war,
the government found it necessary to enter into many lines of business,
For that generally corporations such as the RACC were established by the
Congress. The conclusion seems to be that by so doing much of the
red tape and difficulties in connection with direct governmental activities
could be avoided. The intent of Congress seems to have been to secure
the conveniences of carrying on business activities through these corporations which were enjoyed by private corporations. It would seem
to follow that these corporations should be subject to the same limitations as private corporations and the holdings of the courts seem to
largely sustain that.
With regard to the RACC the Court, in Keifer & Keifer v. Reconstruction Finance Corp., supra, says this:
"To give Regional an immunity denied to more than two score corporations, each designed for a purpose of government not relevantly different
from that which occasioned the creation of Regional, is to impute to
Congress a desire for incoherence in a body of affiliated enactments and
for drastic legal differentiation where policy justifies none. A fair judgment of the statute in its entire setting relieves us from making such an
imputation of caprice."
In United States v. Brown, 41 Fed. Supp. 838, the Federal District
Court of S. D. Florida held that "The Regional agricultural credit corporations are purely 'commercial corporations' exercising no sovereign
function." And it says:
"The mere fact that the United States owns all the capital stock of these
corporations is not alone sufficient to endow them with sovereign immunity
nor do they acquire such immunity merely because they are the medium
through which the Government carries out certain proprietary activities.
Note, 83 L. Ed. 709. et seq."
and, further:
"When a corporation is created for commercial as distinguished from
Governmental purposes, it is ordinarily implied in the absence of statutory provisions to the contrary, that such corporation shall have all the
requisities and responsibilities of corporate existence, even though the
United States owns all the stock. Such a corporation is an entity separate
from the Unted States. United States v. Strang, 254 U. S. 491, 41 S. Ct.
165, 65 L. Ed. 368."
This was a suit to determine whether the RACC was immune from
taxation on real property and the court concludes:
"The statute being silent, the same reasons which deny Regional's immunity from suit, impel the same conclusion with respect to taxation of
its real property. Both are sovereign immunities of like quality. No doubt
Congress might grant one and withhold the other. But no evidence of
such Congressional intent is to be found in the controlling statute. It
follows that these lands were subject to taxation for the years 1939 and
1940."
In the case of the United States v. Guaranty Trust Company of New
York, 280 U. S. Rep. 478 the question was whether .notes given by the
Minneapolis and St. Louis Railroad to the Government under title II of
Transportation Act of 1920 were entitled to preference and priority over
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claims of all creditors under section 3466 of Revised Statutes USC Tit.
31, section 191, in the Bankruptcy Courts. The loans represented by the
notes were made to the railway company to enable it to meet its fixed
charges and operating expenses, its maturing indebtedness, provides
itself with equipment or other additions and betterments, all were made
only on security and on reasonable assurance of the applicant's ability
to repay. The court says:
"These appropriations were made in order to meet a pressing need. At
the time of the passage of Transportation Act, 1920, most of the railroads
of the United States lacked funds for necessary improvements, equipment,
and expansion of facilities. Some of the carriers needed funds, also
to meet maturing obligations. The credit of many carriers was seriously
impaired. There was a general reluctance among investors to purchase
new railroad securities even of the strongest railroads. Congress deemed
it important to preserve for the nation substantially the whole existing
transportation system. Compare New England Divisions Case, 261 U. S.
184, 190. In order to accomplish this, it was thought necessary that the
United States should, to a certain extent, finance the carriers until it
would, become possible to restore their credit, by increase of rates or
otherwise. The provisions of Title II of Transportation Act, 1920, were
framed to that end. Through them, the financial aid which had been given
during Federal control was to be extended for a further period.
To have given priority to debts due the United States pursuant to Title
II, would have defeated the purpose of Congress. It not only would have
prevented the restablishment of, railroad credit among bankers and investors, but it would even have seriously impaired the market value of
outstanding railroad securities. It would have deprived the carriers of
the credit commonly enjoyed from supplymen and others; would have
seriously embarrassed the carriers in their daily operations; and would
have made necessary a great enlargement of their working capital. The
provision for loans under Sec. 210 would have been frustrated. For, carriers could ill afford voluntarily to contract new debts, thereunder which
would displace, pro tanto, their existing bonded indebtedness. The entire
spirit of the Act makes clear the purpose that the rule leading to such
consequences should not be applied.
Moreover, Congress evidenced unmistakably its purpose to rely, for obtaining payment of the Government's advances, upon means other than
the priority provided for by sec. 3466. Under all of the sections, the giving of adequate security was either required or left to the discretion of
the President. Under sec. 210 no advance could be made, unless the
Interstate Commerce Commission was satisfied that the earning power
of the carrier and the security given furnished reasonable assurance
that the loan would be repaid and all obligations in connection therewith
would be performed. The interest rate required is much greater than that
which ordinarily accompanies even a business loan carrying such assurance of repayment as would have resulted from an application of the
priority rule. Thus, both the general purposes of Title 11 and its specific
provisions make it clear that Congress intended to exclude the indebtedness so arising from the scope of Sec. 3466 of the Revised Statutes, just as
under the Federal Control Act it had excluded therefrom claims incident
to current operation of the railroads. Mellon v. Michigan Trust Co., 271
U. S. 236, 240."
Thus it appears that the purposes for which the loans to the railroad
were made were identical to the purposes for which the barnyard loans
were made. At the time that Congress passed the act providing for the
organization of the Regional Agricultural 'Corporations the farmers
were in sore need of further credit. The banks could not extend it and, in
fact, would have had to foreclose' on the loans they already had. That
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would, in many cases, have brought an end to such individual agricultural
operations. The continuation of agriculture was deemed essential to the
welfare of the nation. To maintain its credit and the financial structure
this law was passed and the RACC organized. It went into the field as an
ordinary business corporation. It charged at least the going rate of inpercent. It took the security it deemed adequate.
terest, in this case 6
It made collections on its loans in the ordinary manner. When the Regional Agricultural Corporations were liquidated they were found to have
made a profit. The plaintiff, the records will probably show, made the
biggest profit of them all.
On this case of United States of America v. Guaranty Trust Co., of
New York, the Supreme Court of South Dakota largely based its decision in the case of In Re Buttke's Estate. United States Department of
Agriculture, Emergency Crop and Feed Loans, v. Remund. (S. D.) 23 N.
W. 2d, 281. That was based on emergency feed and crop loans made by
the Governor of the Farm Credit Administration to Wilhelm Buttke.
After his death claims were filed and a preference claimed under section
3466 of the Revised Statutes. The probate court disallowed the claim as
not being entitled to preference under the state law. In sustaining that
holding the Supreme Court of South Dakota, after quoting from the
United States of America v. Guaranty Trust Co., supra, said:
"The facts in the foregoing .decision are practically an exact parallel
with the case we have under consideration. In one case the Government
loaned money direct to the needy railroads to assist and sustain the
transportation system, and in our case the money was loaned to needy
farmers with the thought of assisting and sustaining agriculture which
was in distress. The reasons given why the United States should not
claim priority in this case are equally pertinent in our case under
consideration, as knowledge of priority of Government claims certainly
would have been a handicap to a farmer in using his credit with local
bankers and investers. We consider this decision controlling in this case.
Without discussion of them the following supporting decisions are cited:
Keifer & Keifer, a Co-partnership, v. Reconstruction Finance Corporation
and Regional Agricultural Credit Corporation of Sioux City, Iowa, 306 U.
S. 381, 59 S. Ct. 516, 83 L. Ed. 784; United States v. Strang; 254 U. S.
491,41 S. Ct. 165, 65 L. Ed. 368; Eichberg v. United States Shipping
Board Emergency Fleet Corporation, 51 App. D. C. 44, 273 F. 886; Luxton
v. North River Bridge Company, 153 U. S. 525, 14 S. Ct. 891, 38 L. Ed.
808; McCulloch v. State of Maryland, et al., 4 Wheat., 316, 4 L. Ed. 579;
State of Ohio v. Helvering, 292 U .S. 360, 54 S. Ct. 725, 78 L. Ed. 1307;
Guarantee Title & Trust Co., v. Title Guaranty & Surety Co., 224 U. S.
152, 32 S. Ct. 457, 56 L. Ed. 706; Lewis v. United States, 92 U. S. 618, 23 L.
Ed. 513; United States v. State Bank, 6 Pet. 29, 8 L. Ed. 308; United
States v. Mason, 218 U. S. 517, 31 S. Ct. 28, 54 L. Ed. 1133; La Roque v.
United States, 239 U. S. 62, 36 S. Ct. 22, 60 L. Ed. 147; Bank of United
State v. Planters' Bank of Georgia, 9 Wheat., 904 6 L. Ed. 244; Cook
County National Bank v. United States, 107 U. S., 445, 2 S. Ct. 561, 27
L. Ed. 537; State of Georgia v. City of Chattanooga, 264 U. S. 472, 44 S.
Ct. 369, 68 L. Ed. 796."
The United States Supreme Court in United States Department of
Agriculture Emergency Crop & Feeding Loans v. Remund, 330 U. S.
Rep. 539 reversed that holding. In so doing, Mr. Justice Murphy differentiates the Guaranty Trust Company case on the grounds that the Farm
Credit Administration is merely an administrative unit of the United
States Government and he says:
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"It bears none of the features of a government corporation with a legal
entity separate from that of the United States... At no time has the Farm
Credit Administration been other than an unincorporated agency of the
United States Government, administering and lending funds appropriated by Congress out of the United States Treasury and returning the
money to the Treasury upon repayment. In short, it is an integral part
of the government mechanism...
The main contention, however, is that the purpose of the statutes under
which the loans were made is inconsistent with No. 3466, thereby rendering it inapplicable. The Acts of February 23, 1934, and June 19, 1934,
authorize feed and crop loans to farmers in drought and storm stricken
areas of the nation. It is said that the prime purpose of these Acts was
to restore the credit of the farmers and that to give effect to 3466 *vould
impair that credit. Reliance is placed upon United States v. Guaranty
Trust Co., supra. This Court there held that 3466 was inapplicable to the
collection of loans made by the Government to railroad carriers to rehabilitate and maintain their credit status; it was felt that to give priority
under such circumstances would defeat the purpose of the legislation by
impairing the credit of the railroads. See also Cook County National Bank
v. United States, 107 U. S. 445.
But it is manifest that the purpose of the Acts of February 23, 1934, and
June 19, 1934, was to give emergency relief to distressed farmers rather
than to restore their credit status. These were but two of a series of
emergency feed and crop loan statutes enacted at various times from 1921
to 1938, a period when farmers were the victims of repeated crop failures
and adverse economic conditions. Their credit was often impaired, but
their most urgent need was for money to purchase feed and to plant
crops: without such money, distress and unemployment might have been
their lot. It was to meet that urgent need that Congress passed these
statutes.
More specifically, the two Acts under consideration *ere designed to make
loans available to those farmers who were unable to secure credit from
the Production Credit Associations, organized pursuant to the Farm
Credit Act of 1933. It was recognized that many farmers could not
qualify for loans from those Associations. Some method of lending aid
and assistance to those who had no credit and no money with which to
buy feed for their livestock and seeds for their crops was essential in the
absence of a more direct form of Government relief."
Thus the main reasoning of this decision does not apply to the case at
bar. The RACC were not organized to give relief to a distressed individual.
They were organized to maintain his credit and support the financial
system, then also in dire straits. They took security that was considered
adequate. That shows that reliance was made on the ordinary business
methods rather than on any priority rights of the government itself.
Even then Mr. Justice Douglas dissented and "would affirm the judgment on the authority of the United States v. Guaranty & Trust Co.,
280 N. S. 478."
The situation in the case at bar has much more similarity to the facts
in the Guaranty Trust case than it has to the Remund case..
Considering that and the facts in the case, as well as the general
trend of the holdings of the courts of the land heretofore quoted, (and
the court has quoted portions of the cases extensively as counsel may not
have them available in their libraries.) and because it seems to be the
logical interpretation of the statute when viewed in connection with all
the circumstances of the time, that the RACC should be subject to all
the liabilities of a private corporation, this court holds that the North
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Dakota statute of limitations, section 28-0116 N. D. R. C. 1943, applies
in this case and bars recovery in court on the notes sued upon.
That does not mean that defendant should not pay his just debt. The
moral obligation is there still. He should not foreget that the RACC
helped him out when he needed it. Now that fortune has smiled on farming and given the defendant the opportunity to recoup his fortunes it is
not but fair that he should make a reasonable settlement. In that connection, however, it would hardly be fair for the RACC, or whoever now
handles that paper, to charge 6
per cent interest for all this time.
Interest rates have gone down and the government has been repaid for all
its advances in the RACC. To still try to collect 6Y per cent interest is
just as unreasonable as it would be for the defendant to avoid his normal
obligation of he has the means to take care of it. The RACC, like any
other corporation, should make the best settlement it can under the circumstances.
The attorney for the defendant may draw up the necessary findings,
conclusions and order for judgment in accordance herewith.
Dated April 3, 1948.
By the Court:
G. Grimson
Judge

